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Abstract
We investigate whether politicians whose family relatives previously served in parliament and
cabinet enjoy a competitive “legacy advantage” in progressing from the backbenches to cab-
inet. This advantage may stem from two potential mechanisms: a direct effect attributable
to the informational advantages of legacies, or an indirect effect that operates through greater
electoral strength. We evaluate the relative contribution of each mechanism using candidate-
level data from Irish parliamentary elections and cabinets from 1944-2016. Our results reveal
that politicians with a family history in cabinet do enjoy an advantage in cabinet selection, and
that this advantage cannot be attributed simply to greater electoral popularity.
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Under parliamentarism, the cabinet “emerges from” the legislature and represents the apex of po-
litical power. Scholars have thus long sought to understand which political parties win cabinet
seats, particularly in coalition governments, as the interparty distribution of ministerial portfolios
can impact policy outputs (Laver and Schofield, 1998; Strøm, Mu¨ller and Bergman, 2003; Ba¨ck,
Debus and Dumont, 2011). Yet cabinets are ultimately composed of individual politicians within
parties. Despite this fact, and the potential for significant individual ministerial autonomy and dis-
cretion (Laver and Shepsle, 1994, 1996), we know relatively little about the intraparty distribution
of ministerial portfolios.
Multiple factors may be involved in determining how positions of power are distributed to
members of parliament (MPs). All parties and legislatures, like most organizations generally, are
structured according to some form of hierarchy, such that some MPs are promoted to a finite num-
ber of positions of power in the party, parliament, and government, while others continue to warm
the backbenches, sometimes for their entire careers (Strøm, 1997). Existing research suggests that
the probability of promotion to cabinet is related to an MP’s length of time in parliament (senior-
ity), electoral popularity (in preferential electoral systems), education, gender, policy preferences,
and other less-tangible personal traits (e.g., Blondel and Thie´bault, 1991; Laver and Shepsle, 1994;
Dowding and Dumont, 2008, 2013).1
In this study, we consider one previously unexplored source of potential inequality of op-
portunity in ministerial selection: the existence of powerful family dynasties within parties. Dy-
nasties are common in many democracies, and tend to enjoy significant electoral advantages over
other candidates under electoral systems with candidate-based voting (e.g., Laband and Lentz,
1985; Ishibashi and Reed, 1992; Dal Bo´, Dal Bo´ and Snyder, 2009; Feinstein, 2010; Smith, 2012;
Asako et al., 2015; Querubin, 2016). The existing literature attributes this electoral advantage pri-
marily to the informational cue that family “brand” or name recognition has on voters. Building
1In the next section, we provide a more complete review of the literature on ministerial selection, which has
expanded considerably in recent years. Recent studies on the de-selection of ministers include Huber and Martinez-
Gallardo (2008), Dewan and Myatt (2010), Berlinski, Dewan and Dowding (2010), Fischer, Dowding and Dumont
(2012), and Indridason and Kam (2008).
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on this literature, we investigate whether and how MPs who come from such dynasties, who we
call “legacies,” also possess advantages over non-legacies in promotion from the backbench to the
cabinet.2
Anecdotal evidence of a legacy advantage in cabinet selection is abundant. For example,
Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, son of former Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau, reached the
apex of power in 2015 at age 43—after only serving two previous terms in the House of Commons.
In 2008, Yuko Obuchi, daughter of former Japanese Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi, was similarly
appointed to cabinet in her third term, at the age of 34. Most Japanese MPs are not considered for a
cabinet position until at least five or six terms. In Norway, former Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg,
son of Minister of Defense and Minister of Foreign Affairs Thorvald Stoltenberg, had only served
two years as a substitute member in the Storting (parliament) before being appointed to cabinet
in his first full term in 1993, at the age of 34. A brief glance at recent presidential politics in
the United States also suggests a legacy advantage in executive politics outside of parliamentary
regimes—the 2016 presidential primary featured a Clinton, a Bush, and a Paul; all familiar names
from previous contests.3
A legacy advantage in cabinet selection, we hypothesize, may result from two potential
mechanisms. The first can be considered a direct effect of dynastic ties that includes the inter-
generational transmission of political knowledge, connections, and resources, as well as the in-
formational cue of family name and reputation to party leaders involved in ministerial selection.
For simplicity, we call this the informational advantage. The second potential mechanism is an
indirect, mediating effect of dynastic ties that operates through the greater electoral strength of
2Specifically, we define a legacy as any candidate who is related by blood or marriage (e.g., child, grandchild, sib-
ling, spouse, son-in-law, or other such relative) to a politician formerly or currently holding national office (including
cabinet positions) who served prior to the first election of the candidate. If a legacy is elected, he or she creates a
dynasty, which we define as any family in which two or more members served non-concurrently in national office.
In other words, if two family members are first elected in the same election, or are married after being elected, then
neither counts as a legacy, and the two do not constitute a dynasty.
3According to a working paper by Besley and Reynal-Querol (2015), 15-20 percent of political executives cross-
nationally have been legacies since the 1990s.
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legacies. We call this the electoral advantage.4
We distinguish between two types of legacies among MPs: cabinet legacies whose prede-
cessors had experience as cabinet ministers; and non-cabinet legacies whose predecessors never
advanced beyond the backbenches. We argue that, while both types of legacies may enjoy signif-
icant electoral advantages in their districts, cabinet legacies should be expected to enjoy a larger
intraparty informational advantage over fellow MPs in gaining promotion from the backbenches to
the cabinet. This is because cabinet legacies inherit the knowledge, political resources, high-level
connections, and family track record in cabinet that helps them to stand out above their co-partisan
peers in ministerial selection. In contrast, legacies whose relatives did not serve in the cabinet
may inherit the knowledge, connections, and name recognition to be successful electorally in their
districts, but this knowledge does not necessarily provide the same informational advantage in
terms of leadership promotion within the party. As such, cabinet legacies can be expected to reach
ministerial office faster than both non-cabinet legacies and non-legacies.
We test our prediction that cabinet legacies are advantaged relative to other MPs in ad-
vancement from the backbenches to cabinet with new candidate-level data from Irish parliamentary
elections and cabinets from 1944-2016. Members of the Irish Da´il (the lower and more important
chamber of the bicameral Houses of the Oireachtas) are known as Teachtaı´ Da´la (TDs), and are
elected via the single-transferable vote (STV) electoral system in multi-member districts, with an
average district magnitude (M) of four seats.5 In such a system, district races usually feature mul-
tiple candidates from each of the larger parties, and this intraparty competition weakens the value
of the party label and encourages the development of dynasties, whose members can inherit the
bailiwicks of their predecessors and enjoy considerable electoral advantages (Smith, 2012). As
a result, members of dynasties have accounted for a sizeable percentage of candidates, TDs, and
4What we call the informational advantage could more accurately be considered the residual of all non-electoral
advantages that legacies enjoy, including information, resources, wealth, and education. We explore some of these
potential mechanisms in a later section.
5The number of districts in our sample varies from a low of 34 in 1944 to a high of 43 in 2007 and 2011. Apart
from three 7-member districts in 1944, all districts elect 3, 4, or 5 members.
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cabinet ministers in Ireland (Figure 1). Among all candidates from 1944-2016, 14 percent were
legacies of one type or the other. Among elected TDs, the proportion increases to 25 percent. Yet
among cabinet ministers, the proportion is even higher: 29 percent, on average, and in some cab-
inets higher than 40 percent (including the current cabinet of Prime Minister Enda Kenny, at 44
percent). The increase is mostly attributable to more cabinet legacies getting appointed. One min-
ister, Kevin Boland, the son of Gerald Boland (a 13-term Fianna Fa´il member and former Minister
of Justice), was appointed Minister of Defense after his very first election to the Da´il in 1957.
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Figure 1: Proportion of legacies among candidates, TDs, government-party TDs, and cabinet ministers in the
Republic of Ireland, 1944-2016
Source: The primary sources of the candidate data are Elections Ireland (electionsireland.org), Gallagher (1993),
and Gallagher (2009) for elections prior to 2011. Source for 2011 and 2016 elections is The Independent newspaper
(online). Ministerial appointment data are from the website of the Department of the Taoiseach (Prime Minister). Data
sources for family ties are listed in footnote 9.
Note: Observations pooled across all elections from 1944-2016. Includes by-election candidates and winners. Online
Appendix Figure A.1 shows the percentages for each type of legacy over time.
The overrepresentation of cabinet legacies in ministerial positions indicates that, in addition
to the well-known legacy advantage in elections, there may also be a legacy advantage in cabinet
promotion. However, it is unclear to what extent this advantage stems indirectly from the electoral
advantages of legacy versus the less-tangible, though more direct, informational advantage. Are
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cabinet legacies overrepresented in cabinet simply because they are better at getting votes, and thus
are more senior and electorally popular, on average, than non-legacies or non-cabinet legacies in
their parties? Or do cabinet legacies enjoy an additional advantage owing to their closer ties to
party leaders and an established family record in high-level politics?
Our main contribution in this study is to provide a theoretical explanation for a legacy
advantage in cabinet promotion that incorporates both the electoral and informational advantages
of members of dynasties, and how these may differ depending on the family history of an individual
MP. We then empirically test the predictions of this theory with our novel Irish data, first using
candidate-level observations to examine the electoral advantages of different legacy types, and
then TD-level observations to evaluate the relative influence of the electoral and informational
advantages of legacy in cabinet selection decisions.
The results of our analyses reveal that, although cabinet legacies and non-cabinet legacies
enjoy equally significant electoral advantages over non-legacies, only cabinet legacies enjoy an
advantage in ministerial selection. In other words, the advantage of cabinet legacies in ministerial
selection cannot simply be attributed to their greater electoral strength. This finding points to a
potential inequality in access to positions of power in parliamentary systems, with broad implica-
tions for our understanding of the development of democracy and representative government. After
presenting our main results, we explore several other potential mechanisms behind the advantage
with variables related to experience, demographics, education, dynasty strength, and party regional
strength. Although the observational nature of our data does not allow us to rule out all possible
mechanisms, we find that differences in level and place of education between cabinet legacies and
other TDs may be an important part of the legacy advantage in cabinet selection. The former hints
at potential differences in qualifications, while the latter hints at elite network effects.
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Reaching the Top: Ministerial Selection in Parliamentary Democ-
racies
As Ba¨ck, Debus and Dumont (2011, p. 442) note, the question of “who gets which ministerial
remits and why?” has traditionally been answered with a party-level variable, focused on the
distribution of cabinet seats between parties in the legislature and side-stepping the question of
which individuals within parties attain ministerial office. Similarly, intraparty analyses have tended
to focus on the allocation of portfolios to groups within parties, such as factions (e.g., Leiserson,
1968; Mershon, 2001; Ono, 2012). In reality, ministerial positions are significant post-election
offices filled by individual MPs. Just as parties and candidates compete with each other for elective
office, so too must MPs within parties compete for higher positions of power (Andeweg, 2000;
Saalfeld, 2000).
The existing literature identifies a number of factors that might influence individual min-
isterial selection decisions within parties. In an early contribution, Blondel and Thie´bault (1991)
focus on the personal characteristics and social backgrounds of West European ministers and find
that they tend to be older and more highly educated, and tend to have had longer careers within
the party than their backbench colleagues. O’Malley (2006) explores the basis for selecting min-
isters in Ireland through interviews with former party leaders and ministers, and also finds that
personal characteristics matter: in particular, prime ministers value “talent, loyalty, experience,
tenacity, cleanliness (from corruption) and good personal relations” (O’Malley, 2006, p. 329). His
quantitative analysis reveals little evidence of the often assumed geographical dispersion of posts,
but does find that ministers tend to display higher levels of education, longer lengths of tenure in
parliament, and greater success in previous general elections. In Canada, Kerby (2009) also finds
that seniority, gender, level of education, age, and prior ministerial experience help predict who
becomes a minister. As in the Irish case, electoral popularity correlates positively with being se-
lected for cabinet—on average, cabinet appointees have a margin of victory of 26 percentage points
over runners-up in their districts, compared to 23 percentage points for those governing-party MPs
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who are not appointed. Thus, one commonly shared characteristic of ministers compared to non-
ministers is that ministers are ex ante electorally successful.
In another recent study, Pekkanen, Nyblade and Krauss (2014) argue that electoral reform
in Japan altered the strategies of party leaders in cabinet selection. Under the current mixed system
combining single-member districts and proportional representation, electoral competition is less
focused on individual candidates (relative to the previous multi-member district system), and more
centered on the image of the party leader and platform. As a result, prime ministers have an
incentive to pay less attention to factional balancing and routine promotion based on seniority, and
instead appoint more policy experts to serve the party’s policy goals and more women to help the
party appear more diverse.
We seek to contribute to this growing literature on the intraparty determinants of individ-
ual ministerial selection by examining whether being a member of a political dynasty creates an
advantage for some MPs over others in the race to win a cabinet seat. We distinguish between
two potential mechanisms underlying the legacy advantage: an electoral advantage that represents
an indirect or mediating effect of legacy, and an informational advantage that we consider a more
direct effect of legacy. Importantly, the nature and value of this informational advantage can vary
depending on an MP’s family history in cabinet.
Further and Faster: The Theoretical Advantages of Legacy
To understand the advantage of legacy in securing a seat in cabinet, let us first consider the role
and preferences of the person who selects members of the cabinet. As Dewan and Hortala-Vallve
(2011, p. 610) note, “The prime minister chooses who is promoted to the cabinet and who remains
on the backbenches.” We assume that the prime minister makes a deliberate choice in selecting who
to appoint, aiming to promote co-partisans who will perform the duties of office most effectively—
those who Laver and Shepsle (1994, p. 302) describe as “ministerable.” It is important to appoint
the most competent individuals possible since the performance of the government is dependent, at
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least in part, on the performance of individual ministers. As members of the cabinet, ministers are
individually responsible for the performance of their ministries, but also represent the public face
of the cabinet collectively, both in parliament and in the media. As such, the popularity of the party
(or parties) in government is linked to the individual performance and popularity of ministers, and
appointing the right (or wrong) ministers can have consequences for a governing party’s ability to
win votes and seats at election time (Mu¨ller and Strøm, 1999).6
From the perspective of individual MPs, ministerial office is highly desirable. Ministerial
office produces for the officeholder the ability to influence policy, and also comes with a number
of personal payoffs, including greater status and pecuniary benefits—such as a higher salary, en-
hanced pensions upon leaving office, and a personal bureaucracy—as well as significant electoral
rewards (Martin, 2016). This demand for ministerial office contrasts with the supply of positions.
Not every backbencher can become a minister. First, parties arguably need backbenchers in order
to conduct ordinary parliamentary business. Second, constitutions often specify a maximum size
of cabinet—for example, fifteen ministers according to the Constitution of Ireland. Combining
the significant demand for higher office with the under-supply of positions creates a classic, but
nevertheless high-stake, principal-agent selection game for the prime minister. Like with voters
selecting MPs, the prime minister operates with limited or imperfect information when selecting
his or her cabinet.
Voters often rely on cues and shortcuts in making informed choices under limited informa-
tion (Lupia and McCubbins, 1998). So, too, must the prime minister in selecting her cabinet. The
prime minister has some opportunities to observe and learn about would-be ministers: in the party
caucus, on the floor of the chamber, in committees, and through public appearances. Such events
provide would-be ministers with opportunities to impress the prime minister. As such, the cabi-
net selection game can be viewed as a game between the prime minister and would-be ministers.
Would-be ministers need to signal to the prime minister that they have the qualities necessary to
6Dewan and Dowding (2005) find that removing an unpopular minister can significantly enhance the popularity of
the government.
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be a successful minister and thereby contribute to the positive reputation of the prime minister, the
party, and government.
While some personal traits that would aid appointment to ministerial office are fixed, many
characteristics and skills can be developed and enhanced. As Kerby (2009, p. 602) notes, what
scholars of ministerial selection take to be electoral popularity in the district may be a proxy for
other less tangible qualities, including “political capital, constituency support, organizational abil-
ity, or finesse.” Some individual MPs have more charisma or talent than others, but such skills
can also be learned and developed over time. On the other hand, some fixed characteristics of an
individual MP represent ex ante endowments that may give him or her advantages over peers in
developing these skills, or that represent inherently attractive qualities that make him or her more
focal to party leaders in appointment decisions. We believe that legacy status may fall into this
category of traits.
Because they can often “inherit” the name recognition, financial resources, and political
connections of their predecessors, legacy candidates tend to enjoy a considerable electoral advan-
tage over other candidates. For example, Feinstein (2010) estimates that this advantage in the case
of the U.S. House of Representatives is roughly 4 percentage points of the vote, about half the size
of the well-known incumbency advantage. Smith (2012) and Asako et al. (2015) find even larger
electoral advantages in Japan, as does Querubin (2016) in the Philippines. In Ireland, we expect
that legacies of both types enjoy a similar electoral advantage:
• (H1) Both non-cabinet legacies and cabinet legacies enjoy an electoral advantage over non-
legacies.
The electoral advantage can insulate legacies from competition and help them to achieve
greater seniority in their parties. It may also signal to party leaders that legacies will be more
capable, or at the very least more popular, cabinet ministers. Another view is that weak parties,
such as those in Ireland, may try to keep electorally powerful members happy by rewarding them
with cabinet positions. For example, O’Malley (2006) notes that Irish prime ministers need to be
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cognizant of the personal vote of individual party members, and provide those who are electorally
popular with sufficient promise of career promotion to avoid defections or leadership challenges
(see also Martin, 2014). In both of these views, the relationship between legacy status and cabinet
appointment can be judged to operate via the mediating effect of the electoral advantage. Any
legacy advantage in cabinet promotion may at least in part be the result of the greater electoral
advantages of legacies, including the ability to reach higher levels of seniority in the party and earn
higher vote shares in each election.
However, legacies may also enjoy an informational advantage with regard to promotion that
extends beyond their electoral advantages. Dynasties continue to exist in politics, as in family-run
businesses, in part because they retain and internally transfer critical information. For example, in
considering the backgrounds of members of the U.S. Congress, Parker (1996, p. 88) views legacy
status as a decided advantage to both legislators and legislatures, since legacies are often familiar
enough with the ways of parliament to hit the ground running on day one: “Family members
pass on a number of attributes that are beneficial to a legislature [as they] can act in a tutorial
capacity: knowledge is transmitted about the legislative processes (e.g., logrolling) and norms in
the legislature (e.g., universalism).”7 We see an analogy with the well-established literature on the
experience of first-generation college students (students whose parents did not go to university)
compared with students whose families have a history of sending their children to university. That
literature observes that first-generation college students tend to underperform, at least initially,
relative to other students, even controlling for IQ and high school grades (Terenzini et al., 1996).
Sociologists and economists have studied the phenomenon of intergenerational transmis-
sion of many human outcome variables—such as labor market status, class, income, wealth, and
criminality. For example, Blau and Duncan (1967) observe high levels of occupational inheritance—
a situation where an offspring chooses the same career as one of their parents—among indepen-
dent professionals, family business owners, and farmers. Ganzeboom, Treiman and Ultee (1991, p.
7An intergenerational transfer of knowledge need not be the exclusive preserve of dynasties. Political networks or
machines may be built within a particular cadre of individuals who are not related by blood or marriage. However,
machines in Ireland have typically been dynastic in nature (Sacks, 1976).
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277) suggest an “intergenerational transmission of socioeconomic advantage” as the likely causal
mechanism behind occupational inheritance. Laband and Lentz (1983) argue instead for a rational-
economic basis to occupational inheritance. For them, following in the career footsteps of a parent
is a way to effect a transfer of “intangible wealth.” Such intangible assets include “specialized
knowledge, goodwill, brand (or name) loyalty, and other types of family-specific capital whose
present value cannot be fully captured (realized) by the parent” (Laband and Lentz, 1983, p. 474).
In short, these intangibles (that make up what we collectively call the informational advantage)
provide a comparative advantage to successors both inside and outside the world of politics.
When it comes to ministerial selection, we expect that this informational advantage will be
strongest for legacies whose predecessors served in cabinet. Our core suggestion is that cabinet
legacies are more likely to have knowledge of the “rules of the game” in terms of what it takes to
become a minister and how to promote those qualities that prime ministers find desirable. Cabinet
legacies have often been exposed to the workings of high-level party politics from an early age, and
may possess an informational advantage from the inter-generational familiarity with the ways of
party politics and ministerial selection. Moreover, a national-level reputation and the knowledge of
how the top levels of government work is a characteristic of value to the party leader. As O’Malley
(2006, p. 320) writes with regard to cabinet appointments in Ireland, prime ministers “will want to
hire a ‘safe pair of hands.”’
Recent work by Pekkanen, Nyblade and Krauss (2014, p. 14) hypothesize that an over-
representation of cabinet legacies in Japan after its electoral reform may be due to the greater
national-level reputations that these MPs enjoy, and the attractiveness of such reputations to party
leaders trying to build popular cabinets.8 The informational advantage of cabinet legacies may
thus help them to move up the party ranks faster than even their peers with equivalent levels of
seniority or local-level electoral popularity. In contrast, although non-cabinet legacies may know
8Similarly, Taniguchi (2008) finds that legacies in Japan were overrepresented in cabinet in 1996 (after the first
election following reform), even controlling for seniority. A recent dissertation by Van Coppenolle (2014) also finds
that cabinet legacies in the UK are more likely to get promoted to cabinet, though she does not explore the mechanisms
underlying the different probabilities.
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how to win votes in their districts and thus obtain high levels of seniority, this knowledge does not
necessarily translate to the intraparty game of ministerial selection.
In short, knowing the attributes desired of a minister and knowing how to signal that one
possesses these attributes may create a competitive informational advantage for cabinet legacies
when it comes to moving from the backbenches to cabinet, even beyond the electoral advantages
enjoyed by legacies more generally. This discussion leads us to two additional hypotheses to take
to our empirical data:
• (H2) To the extent that non-cabinet legacies enjoy an advantage in cabinet selection, it oper-
ates primarily through the electoral advantage.
• (H3) Cabinet legacies enjoy an additional advantage in cabinet selection that operates through
the informational advantage.
Data and Empirical Strategy
We use panel data on all candidates who ran for the Irish Da´il between 1944-2016 to test our the-
oretical predictions about the influence of legacy on ministerial selection decisions and determine
the relative contribution of the electoral and informational advantages. Our candidate-level data
allow us to accurately investigate the electoral advantages enjoyed by legacies. For our analysis of
the legacy advantage in cabinet promotion, we focus on backbench governing-party TDs.
Ireland is an ideal case for our empirical analysis because of the presence of a substantial
number of dynasties, the stability of the electoral and party systems over time, the discretion that
prime ministers enjoy in choosing their cabinets, and the norm of appointing ministers from among
lower house TDs. Upper house (Seanad) members and non-TDs have rarely been appointed; thus,
governing-party TDs represent the pool of potential appointees. The governing parties in the 21
terms and 27 cabinets that make up our data sample most often included one of the two main
parties—Fianna Fa´il or Fine Gael—the latter usually in coalition with Labour. Table 1 lists all of
the cabinets and governing parties from 1944-2016.
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Table 1: Cabinets and governing parties in the Republic of Ireland, 1944-2016
Da´il Year Cabinet Dates in Office Governing Parties
12 1944 de Valera 8 6/9/1944 - 2/18/1948 FF
13 1948 Costello 1 2/18/1948 - 6/13/1951 FG-Lab-NL-CnT-CnP
14 1951 de Valera 9 6/13/1951 - 6/2/1954 FF
15 1954 Costello 2 6/2/1954 - 3/20/1957 FG-Lab-CnT
16 1957 de Valera 10 3/20/1957 - 6/23/1959 FF
Lemass 1 6/23/1959 - 10/11/1961 FF
17 1961 Lemass 2 10/11/1961 - 4/21/1965 FF
18 1965 Lemass 3 4/21/1965 - 11/10/1966 FF
Lynch 1 11/10/1966 - 7/2/1969 FF
19 1969 Lynch 2 7/2/1969 - 3/14/1973 FF
20 1973 Cosgrave 3/14/1973 - 7/5/1977 FG-Lab
21 1977 Lynch 3 7/5/1977 - 12/11/1979 FF
Haughey 1 12/11/1979 - 6/30/1981 FF
22 1981 Fitzgerald 1 6/30/1981 - 3/9/1982 FG-Lab
23 1982a Haughey 2 3/9/1982 - 12/14/1982 FF
24 1982b Fitzgerald 2 12/14/1982 - 3/10/1987 FG-Lab
25 1987 Haughey 3 3/10/1987 - 7/12/1989 FF
26 1989 Haughey 4 7/12/1989 - 2/11/1992 FF-PD
Reynolds 1 2/11/1992 - 1/12/1993 FF-PD
27 1992 Reynolds 2 1/12/1993 - 12/15/1994 FF-Lab
Bruton 712/15/1994 - 6/26/1997 FG-Lab-DL
28 1997 Ahern 1 6/26/1997 - 6/6/2002 FF-PD
29 2002 Ahern 2 6/6/2002 - 6/14/2007 FF-PD
30 2007 Ahern 3 6/14/2007 - 5/7/2008 FF-PD-G
Cowen 5/7/2008 - 3/9/2011 FF-PD-G
31 2011 Kenny 1 3/9/2011 - 5/6/2016 FG-Lab
32 2016 Kenny 2 5/6/2016 - present FG-Independents*
Note: FF: Fianna Fa´il; FG: Fine Gael; Lab: Labour; NL: National Labour; CnT: Clann na Talmhan; CnP: Clann na
Poblachta; PD: Progressive Democrats; DL: Democratic Left; G: Greens. Dates recorded as month/day/year. (*) Enda
Kenny’s second government (2016) was a minority government formed with the support of nine independents, who
are considered “governing party” TDs for the purpose of our analysis.
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Family Ties of Candidates and TDs
Our candidate-level data contain 8,715 observations on 3,721 individuals across 21 general elec-
tions and 97 by-elections. Although our sample commences with the 1944 general election, we
code the dynastic ties of candidates to former TDs and ministers going as far back as 1918, the year
before the meeting of the first Da´il, and a few candidates are even related to pre-Independence Irish
MPs who served in the U.K. House of Commons—thus, there is minimal risk of an artificial in-
crease in our measurement of dynasties over time owing to the observability of anterior relatives.9
For elected TDs, our data include detailed biographical information on prior local-level political
experience, service in the Seanad, former occupation, place of education, level of education, place
of birth, age, and gender.
Of the 3,721 individual candidates in the sample, 274 were legacies (188 non-cabinet lega-
cies; 86 cabinet legacies), and of these, 203 were elected to the Da´il at least once during the time
period we study (143 non-cabinet legacies; 60 cabinet legacies). Table 2 details the frequency and
percentage of different types of family relations of candidates and TDs, and the number of family
generations for elected TDs. For candidates with multiple generations of TDs before them, we
use the most immediately preceding relation. The most common family predecessor is a father—
55 percent of all legacy candidates and TDs followed in their father’s footsteps.10 In terms of
generation, 62 percent of legacy TDs were only the second person in their families to serve in
9The complete candidate-level data contain 11,670 observations on 4,716 individuals across 32 general elections
and 131 by-elections held between 1918-2016. We code family ties to former TDs for both elected and unelected can-
didates. The data were compiled from multiple sources, including the Houses of the Oireachtas Members Database
(www.oireachtas.ie), Elections Ireland (electionsireland.org), Gallagher (1993), Gallagher (2009), and newspaper
records. Further biographical information was compiled from the Dictionary of Irish Biography (dib.cambridge.org),
various editions of almanacs such as the Nealon’s Guide, Magill Book, and Thom’s Commercial Directory, newspaper
reports, candidate websites, and census records. It is possible that some non-obvious relations escaped our coding.
However, such obscure relationships would have also likely been obscure to voters and party leaders, and thus less
pertinent to the legacy advantage we aim to evaluate.
10Several other n-th generation candidates also had paternal predecessors but were preceded most proximally by a
brother, mother, or other relative. Approximately 85 percent of candidates succeeded their predecessor with no time
gap; over 95 percent had a gap of less than ten years. The largest gap between a predecessor and a successor is 33
years.
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Table 2: Family relationships and generations Irish legacy candidates and TDs
Candidates TDs
Nearest Predecessor N % N %
Father 140 51.09 111 54.68
Father-in-law 4 1.46 4 1.97
Brother/half-brother 38 13.87 23 11.33
Grandfather 4 1.46 2 0.99
Uncle/great uncle 33 12.04 28 13.79
Mother 5 1.82 3 1.48
Sister/half-sister 5 1.82 2 0.99
Aunt/great aunt 1 0.36 0 0.00
Spouse 13 4.74 11 5.42
Cousin 14 5.11 8 3.94
Other relative 16 5.84 10 4.93
Son 1 0.36 1 0.49
Total 274 100 203 100
Generation N %
Second 126 62.07
Third 40 19.70
Fourth 22 10.84
Fifth 6 2.96
Sixth 4 1.97
Seventh 3 1.48
Eighth 1 0.49
Ninth 1 0.49
Total 203 100
Note: The single case in the Son category is Patrick Lenihan, who is the only parent to follow a child (Brian Lenihan,
Sr.) into politics. The Other relative category includes in-laws, second cousins, and any case where the exact nature of
the relationship could not be determined (e.g., because sources listed the individual only as a “relative.” The family that
has supplied the most TDs is the O’Higgins dynasty, of which Irish nationalist and founding father Kevin O’Higgins
was a member. His brother, Tom O’Higgins, Sr., also served (7th generation), along with his nephews, Tom O’Higgins,
Jr. (8th generation), and Michael O’Higgins (9th generation). The other two 7th generation TDs are Louis J. Belton
and John Grattan Esmonde.
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parliament.11
Research Design
Our baseline empirical specification is a linear regression of the form:
Yi = β0 + β1Non-cabinet legacyi + β2Cabinet legacyi + ξi, (1)
where Non-cabinet legacyi is a dummy variable equal to one if candidate i was related to any
current or former TD or Senator who never served in cabinet, and Cabinet legacyi is a dummy
variable equal to one if a legacy candidate’s predecessor served in a cabinet position. The baseline
comparison group is non-legacy candidates and TDs, thus β1 estimates the average advantage for
non-cabinet legacies over non-legacies, and β2 estimates the average advantage for cabinet legacies
over non-legacies. ξi is an error term. In all specifications, we include robust standard errors
clustered at the individual level.
For our candidate-level analysis of the electoral advantage, Yi takes the form of one of two
dependent variables. The first, Wini, is a binary outcome variable for whether candidate i won a
seat in the election. The second dependent variable, Share of quotai, is the share of the Droop quota
obtained by the candidate with first preference votes. The Droop quota (Droop, 1881), measured
as (Total valid votesM+1 ) + 1, is the absolute minimum number of votes that a candidate must earn to
guarantee election. For Ireland’s multi-member districts, this variable serves to normalize our
measure of electoral strength across districts of varying magnitude. In subsequent specifications,
we add party-year and district-year fixed effects (i.e., group dummies for each party (district) in
each year), and controls for gender and whether the individual was a first-time candidate.
To evaluate the legacy advantage in cabinet selection, our dependent variable Yi takes the
11Online Appendix Table A.1 gives complete descriptive statistics on the candidate-level variables in our data set,
as well as the distribution of parties. Candidates occasionally change party labels, but roughly 41 percent of legacies
first ran as Fianna Fa´il candidates; 27 percent first ran as Fine Gael, 11 percent as Labour, 7 percent as independents,
and the remainder were spread across other minor parties.
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form of Cabinet appointmenti, which is a dummy variable for whether TD i was appointed to
cabinet at any point during the legislative term following the general election. We exclude prime
ministers from the sample (as they are the ones selecting ministers), as well as the current Speaker
of the Da´il (Ceann Comhairle), who is not eligible for cabinet appointment, and the previous
term’s Speaker, who is returned to parliament without election.12 Lastly, we exclude opposition
TDs (who are not in the pool of potential appointees) and governing-party TDs with previous
cabinet experience. We focus on first-time appointments since prior cabinet experience can signif-
icantly affect the subsequent electoral advantages of TDs (Martin 2016), as well as the likelihood
of reappointment. The final data sample includes 1,477 observations for 728 individual backbench
governing-party TDs covering 21 legislative terms and 27 cabinets. Of the 728 individual TDs, 155
were appointed to cabinet, an average of seven each term. The sample includes 117 non-cabinet
legacies (16 percent of individuals), 25 of whom were appointed to cabinet; and 49 cabinet legacies
(7 percent of individuals), 19 of whom were appointed to cabinet.
It is difficult to identify the direct effect of the informational advantage since legacy status
contributes to electoral advantages, which are also likely to increase the probability of cabinet
promotion. In other words, any electoral advantages enjoyed by cabinet legacies and non-cabinet
legacies can be considered “post-treatment.” Our empirical strategy is to first estimate the legacy
advantage in cabinet selection without controlling for variables related to the electoral advantage,
and then to evaluate whether the estimate of the effect for each type of legacy is affected when
these controls are included.13 As with our candidate-level analysis, we begin with the simple linear
12Only one prime minister, John A. Costello, did not previously serve in a different cabinet position, though he had
served as Attorney General. By tradition, the deputy speaker (Leas-Cheann Comhairle) is selected from among the
opposition TDs. Two other TDs, Brian Brady and Cormac Breslin of Fianna Fa´il, were returned unopposed in Donegal
West in 1944, as was former Speaker Frank Fahy in 1951, so all are dropped from analyses that include the share of
the quota as a variable (none were appointed to cabinet). By-election winners (42 observations) are included, as there
is no prohibition on their being appointed after the election. In practice, this has happened only once: Hugh Coveney
was appointed Minister of Defense in 1994 after winning a by-election. One minister, James Dillon, ran briefly as an
independent before re-joining Fine Gael. For our analysis, we code him as Fine Gael.
13This is the most straightforward way to evaluate whether the electoral advantage has a mediating effect on cabinet
appointment, but is limited in terms of causal identification of the direct effect because the electoral variables introduce
post-treatment bias. An alternative approach is to use the linear structural equations model (LSEM) approach described
by Baron and Kenny (1986) or the mediation approach described by Imai et al. (2011). However, these approaches are
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regression in equation (1) as our baseline specification. In subsequent specifications, we add party
and party-year fixed effects, and our mediating variables related to electoral strength.
Our variables for electoral strength include Share of quota in the most recent election,
and Number of wins, which is the number of time-t-inclusive legislative terms served. We also
include Number of wins2 to allow for this relationship to be non-linear. After our main analysis,
we further unpack the informational advantage with additional control variables, including prior
political experience in the Seanad and local assemblies, prior occupation, gender, age, local birth,
level of education, and place of education.14
Results
We have argued that the overall legacy advantage in cabinet promotion, if it exists, may be related
to two potential mechanisms: the electoral advantages of legacy and the informational advantages
inherent within dynasties. Before evaluating the legacy advantage in cabinet selection, however,
we first use the sample of all candidates to evaluate the electoral advantage enjoyed by both cabinet
and non-cabinet legacies over non-legacies.
The Legacy Advantage in Elections
Table 3 gives the results using Wini as the dependent variable. In specification (1), we do not
include any fixed effects or controls. In specification (2), we add party-year fixed effects. In
specification (3), we instead use district-year fixed effects. Specifications (4) and (5) repeat these
latter two specifications, but add controls for gender (Female) and whether it was the candidate’s
best suited to single-mediator situations and non-categorical explanatory variables.
14Our data do not allow us to control for other factors, such as policy expertise, which may lead to cabinet appoint-
ment (Hallerberg and Wehner, 2013). Ireland scores low on the appointment of technocrats, and while professional
training may explain which minister gets which portfolio (education ministers tend to have previous careers as teach-
ers, for example), no tendency seems to exist between policy background and entry into cabinet. Online Appendix
Table A.2 gives complete descriptive statistics on the TD-level variables in our data set, as well as the distribution of
parties in the sample.
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Table 3: The electoral advantage of legacy: election result
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Non-cabinet legacy 0.378 0.249 0.397 0.205 0.305
(0.025) (0.026) (0.027) (0.024) (0.026)
Cabinet legacy 0.350 0.237 0.398 0.196 0.311
(0.037) (0.037) (0.041) (0.033) (0.037)
Female -0.057 -0.055
(0.018) (0.021)
First-time candidate -0.330 -0.401
(0.012) (0.012)
Constant 0.335 0.352 0.331 0.496 0.509
(0.010) (0.008) (0.010) (0.011) (0.013)
N 8,715 8,715 8,715 8,715 8,715
R2 0.069 0.289 0.127 0.377 0.268
Party-Year FE No Yes No Yes No
District-Year FE No No Yes No Yes
Note: Dependent variable is a dummy variable for whether the candidate won a seat. Robust standard errors in
parentheses. All coefficients are statistically significant at the .001 level, apart from Female in specifications (4) and
(5), which is significant at the .01 level. Results are unaffected if by-elections are excluded (not shown).
first-time running (First-time candidate).
The coefficients on both types of legacy and across all specifications indicate a significant
advantage over non-legacies in getting elected. In our baseline specification, the probability of get-
ting elected increases by roughly 38 percentage points for non-cabinet legacies, and 35 percentage
points for cabinet legacies. However, post-estimation Wald tests for equality of these coefficients
reveal that the difference is not statistically different from zero (and this is also true for all subse-
quent specifications). The point estimates on both types of legacies drop in specification (2), where
we include party-year fixed effects, but still indicate a roughly a 24-percentage-point advantage for
both types of legacies. In other words, when compared to non-legacies within the same party,
non-cabinet legacies and cabinet legacies are equally more likely to get elected. Specification (3)
includes district-year fixed effects, so the estimation is based on differences within electoral dis-
trict contests. Here, is the effect is even greater (40 percentage points), and still equivalent for both
non-cabinet legacies and cabinet legacies. With the controls included in specifications (4) and (5),
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Table 4: The electoral advantage of legacy: share of quota
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Non-cabinet legacy 0.294 0.158 0.292 0.125 0.217
(0.021) (0.020) (0.020) (0.019) (0.019)
Cabinet legacy 0.303 0.182 0.352 0.151 0.282
(0.038) (0.037) (0.042) (0.034) (0.038)
Female -0.052 -0.047
(0.011) (0.015)
First-time candidate -0.250 -0.322
(0.008) (0.009)
Constant 0.451 0.470 0.450 0.580 0.594
(0.008) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.010)
N 8,693 8,693 8,693 8,693 8,693
R2 0.081 0.460 0.240 0.553 0.405
Party-Year FE No Yes No Yes No
District-Year FE No No Yes No Yes
Note: Dependent variable is the proportion of the electoral quota reached by the candidate with his or her first prefer-
ence votes. The number of observations is smaller due to candidates who ran unopposed or who were automatically
returned after serving as Speaker. Robust standard errors in parentheses. All coefficients are statistically significant at
the .001 level, apart from Female in specification (5), which is significant at the .01 level. Results are unaffected if
by-elections are excluded (not shown).
the coefficient estimates drop to between 20 and 30 percentage points.15
In Table 4, we show the results of the same set of model specifications using Share of quotai
as the dependent variable rather than Wini. The number of observations drops to 8,693 since some
candidates are returned unopposed, but the results are largely equivalent to the results using Wini.
Again, across all specifications the difference between the estimates for non-cabinet legacies and
cabinet legacies is statistically indistinguishable from zero.
In sum, the candidate-level analysis reveals that both types of legacies enjoy significant
electoral advantages over non-legacies (in support of H1), and that these electoral advantages are
equivalent across types of legacies. This suggests already that any advantage in cabinet selection
enjoyed by cabinet legacies over non-cabinet legacies is unlikely to be attributable to their greater
electoral strength.
15Excluding by-elections (not shown) reduces the sample to 8,202 observations (8,180 for quota analysis), but does
not significantly affect the results with either dependent variable.
20
The Legacy Advantage in Cabinet Selection
We now turn our attention to evaluating the legacy advantage in cabinet selection and how it differs
across legacy status. Recall that we expect non-cabinet legacies to enjoy an advantage in cabinet
selection only insofar as it operates through the electoral advantage (H2). In contrast, we expect
cabinet legacies to enjoy an advantage in cabinet selection even after controlling for the electoral
advantage (H3). Our preceding analysis already suggests that there should not be a strong effect of
Share of quota, as both types of legacies enjoy more-or-less equal advantages in terms of electoral
strength. We include this variable for completeness in the analysis to follow, but focus our attention
on the differences that remain after controlling for seniority at the time of cabinet formation.
Table 5 gives the results of our regression analysis, where Cabinet appointment is the de-
pendent variable. In specification (1), we present the baseline results with no controls. In speci-
fications (2) and (3), we add party and party-year fixed effects, respectively. In specification (4),
we add Number of wins and Number of wins2 to control for differences in seniority. Since this
specification controls for seniority in the party at the time of cabinet formation without introducing
any post-treatment bias related electoral strength, it is our preferred specification. However, we
also explore the effect of adding Share of quota in specification (5) in order to evaluate the indirect
effect of the electoral advantage.
The results across all specifications indicate a positive and statistically significant relation-
ship between legacy status and cabinet appointment only for cabinet legacies.16 Our estimate of
the legacy advantage for cabinet legacies suggests an approximately 8-percentage-point greater
probability than non-legacies of getting promoted from the backbenches to cabinet. Non-cabinet
legacies enjoy no apparent advantage over non-legacies when it comes to cabinet selection, despite
16Number of wins, Number of wins2, and Share of quota are significant at the .001 level in specifications (4)-(5).
In specifications (1)-(4), the coefficient on Cabinet legacy is significant at the .05 level. In specification (5), the point
estimate drops slighty, but is still significant at the .1 level. We report similar results using the LSEM approach
to mediation (Baron and Kenny, 1986) in Online Appendix Table A.3. When we test cabinet legacies against non-
legacies controlling for seniority and including party-year fixed effects, the LSEM approach gives a total effect of .09
for Cabinet legacy, an indirect effect (through Share of quota) of .05*0.23 = .01, and thus a direct effect of .08 (i.e., 8
percentage points).
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Table 5: The legacy advantage in cabinet selection
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Non-cabinet legacy -0.008 -0.006 -0.010 -0.018 -0.025
(0.020) (0.019) (0.019) (0.020) (0.019)
Cabinet legacy 0.075 0.083 0.082 0.086 0.072
(0.038) (0.037) (0.037) (0.039) (0.042)
Number of wins 0.065 0.050
(0.009) (0.009)
Number of wins2 -0.005 -0.004
(0.001) (0.001)
Share of quota 0.234
(0.039)
Constant 0.101 0.100 0.101 -0.032 -0.193
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.017) (0.033)
N 1,477 1,477 1,477 1,477 1,477
R2 0.004 0.020 0.044 0.078 0.105
Party FE No Yes No No No
Party-Year FE No No Yes Yes Yes
Note: Robust standard errors clustered on individual TD in parentheses. Excluding by-election winners from the
sample (not shown) does not affect the results.
enjoying equivalent electoral advantages, as documented in the previous section.
In combination with the candidate-level results for the legacy advantage in elections, we
interpret this as evidence that non-cabinet legacies inherit skills and connections that are useful for
winning election in their districts, but that these skills may not be valued by party leaders in min-
isterial selection decisions. Given that the advantage in cabinet selection for cabinet legacies does
not operate primarily through the indirect effect of the electoral advantage, there must be something
else about cabinet legacies—what we have collectively labeled the informational advantage—that
is responsible for the differences in promotion.
Unpacking the Informational Advantage
If the legacy advantage in cabinet selection is not related to the electoral advantage, what are the
underlying mechanisms? It is possible that the residual effect we have labeled the informational
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advantage operates through some other pre-electoral mediating variable. For example, one pos-
sibility is that cabinet legacies are more likely than non-cabinet legacies or non-legacies to gain
experience in a local assembly or in the Seanad prior to beginning their careers in the Da´il. Once
elected to the Da´il, they might be viewed as having more experience than other TDs, and thus
more suited for cabinet promotion. Alternatively, cabinet legacies may be more likely to come
from professional career backgrounds, such as law and accounting; or simply have higher levels of
education and skills than non-cabinet legacies and non-legacies. If this is the case, then the legacy
advantage in cabinet selection might not be because prime ministers value cabinet legacies for their
reputation or familiarity, but because they value the combination of experience, demographic at-
tributes, or education that happen to also be more prevalent among cabinet legacies. To the extent
that these attributes are the result of being a cabinet legacy, it may be through them that cabinet
legacies enjoy a greater advantage in cabinet selection.
For all 728 of the individual TDs in our sample, we have complete data on pre-electoral
experience in local assemblies and the Seanad, and prior occupation.17 Figure 2 shows the dif-
ferences across legacy status for these experience-related variables. Notably, cabinet legacies are
more likely to have experience in the Seanad prior to their first election to the Da´il, and are also
more likely to have a career background in a senior managerial or professional occupation.
We also have complete data on the demographic variables of gender and age.18 It is impor-
tant to consider age because, to the extent that legacies tend to enter office at a younger age, they
may seem more attractive than other (older) TDs once they gain similar levels of experience in the
party. For 691 TDs, we have information on place of birth, and can thus measure whether the TD
was born in or around (within the same county) the district where he or she was elected. Figure
3 shows the differences in these variables across legacy status. Legacies of both types are more
17Local assembly members are either directly elected or co-opted into office when a sitting member resigns or dies.
A majority of Senators are elected indirectly in special vocational or university panels; the remainder are appointed by
the prime minister.
18We are missing exact age information for 25 TDs. We estimate the age of these TDs based on the average age
of first-term TDs in each group of legacy status. This is 43 for non-legacies, 38 for non-cabinet legacies, and 37 for
cabinet legacies. Our statistical results are identical if these TDs are excluded from the analysis.
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Figure 2: Pre-electoral attributes, by legacy status: experience
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Note: Variables measured as experience prior to first election. Election to a local assembly or the Seanad after serving
in the Da´il is not counted. Prior occupation is based on the primary occupation of the TD before his or her first election,
and is coded based on the International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO) codes from the International
Labour Organization. Here we group together ISCO 1 (senior officials and managers) and ISCO 2 (professionals).
Y-axis is proportion.
likely to be women, which suggests that dynasties may be a significant pathway into politics for
female candidates in an otherwise male-dominated parliament. Legacies also tend to be younger at
the time of their first election, and a smaller proportion of cabinet legacies were born in the county
where they first won a seat.
Figure 3: Pre-electoral attributes, by legacy status: demographics
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Note: Age at first election is estimated for 25 TDs. Birth data are missing for 37 TDs. Because boundaries sometimes
change, a TD is considered to be born locally if he or she was born in the county containing his or her district (e.g., a
TD born in Cork County or Dublin County is considered local to all districts within those large counties). Localness
is coded at the time of first election. Y-axis is proportion for binary variables; mean for age.
Finally, for a sub-sample of TDs, we have data on place of education, which allow us to
explore the effects of level and place of education. Specifically, we measure whether the TD has
(1) any post-secondary training or university degree, or (2) a post-graduate degree (N = 647). For
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place of education, we consider whether the TD attended University College Dublin (a common
breeding ground for future politicians) (N = 634), and whether the TD’s secondary school was
a fees-paying (private) institution (N = 606). These latter two variables are related to quality
of education, but also hint at network advantages and wealth, respectively. Figure 4 shows the
differences in these variables across legacy status. Here, there are large differences in the attributes
of cabinet legacies relative to non-cabinet legacies and non-legacies. Nearly 86 percent of cabinet
legacies are educated beyond secondary school, compared to only about 60 percent of other TDs.
Moreover, roughly 24 percent of cabinet legacies possess a post-graduate degree, compared to just
8 percent of non-cabinet legacies and 9 percent of non-legacies. Cabinet legacies are also more
likely to have attended UCD (47 percent) than non-cabinet legacies (20 percent) or non-legacies
(20 percent), as well as more likely to have attended a fees-paying secondary school (45 percent,
compared to 26 percent and 14 percent, respectively).
Figure 4: Pre-electoral attributes, by legacy status: education
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Note: Post-secondary education includes training certificates and higher education diplomas, as well as university
degrees. Post-graduate degree includes only M.A., Ph.D., or equivalent. UCD is the University College Dublin. Fee
schools are secondary education institutions that require fees (i.e., private schools). Y-axis is proportion.
Figure 5 presents the coefficients and confidence intervals for Cabinet legacy from separate
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regression models conditioning on the inclusion of these variables. All specifications include party-
year fixed effects and controls for seniority (Number of wins and Number of wins2). Complete
results in table format are presented in Online Appendix Tables A.4, A.5, and A.6. The first
estimate is the same as in specification (4) from the main analysis in Table 5, and is presented here
as the baseline for comparison. Each of the other estimates is from a separate regression with a
single additional control variable related to experience: (1) prior experience in a local assembly,
(2) prior experience in the Seanad, and (3) categorical dummies for prior occupation (based on ten
ISCO occupation codes); demographics: (4) gender (female), (5) age (which we group into five
categories: 21-29; 30-39; 40-49; 50-59; 60-75), and (6) whether the TD was born locally (within
the county); or education: (7) categorical dummies for post-secondary training and post-graduate
degree (secondary or less is the omitted category), (8) whether the TD attended UCD, and (9)
whether the TD attended a fees-paying secondary school.
Among these additional control variables, the measures related to education reduce the
point estimate on Cabinet legacy by the greatest amount. Higher levels of education, attendance
at the elite UCD, and attendance at a fees-paying secondary school are all estimated to increase
the probability of appointment to cabinet.19 Thus, one of the reasons cabinet legacies are over-
represented in cabinet may simply be because they are better qualified than their peers. However,
as all of these variables are also important indicators of network or wealth advantages, which can
be considered “post-treatment” effects of being a cabinet legacy, these correlations also suggest
that part of the informational advantage operates through elite connections and privilege in Irish
society.
Another possible explanation for the advantage enjoyed by cabinet legacies, but not non-
cabinet legacies, is that cabinet legacies may tend to come from more established dynasties or
may enjoy more heuristic cues of the dynasty’s reputation—such as sharing the same last name
19Specifically, TDs with a post-secondary education are 10 percentage points more likely to get appointed to cabinet,
conditioning on legacy status and seniority, and TDs with a post-graduate education are 17 percentage points more
likely. TDs who attended UCD enjoy an 12 percentage-point advantage, and TDs who attended a fees-paying school
enjoy a 6 percentage-point advantage.
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Figure 5: Unpacking the informational advantage: experience, demographics, or education?
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Additional controls included in model:
Note: Figure shows the coefficients and confidence intervals for Cabinet legacy from separate models adding controls
related to experience, demographics, and education. The thick portion of the confidence interval is 90%; the thin por-
tion is 95%. All models include party-year fixed effects, a dummy for Non-cabinet legacy, and controls for Number
of wins and Number of wins2. Experience controls include categorical dummies for prior experience in a local assem-
bly, prior experience in the Seanad, and prior occupation (categorical dummies based on ISCO codes). Demographic
controls include categorical dummies for gender, age group, and whether the TD was born locally (within the county).
Education controls include categorical dummies for level of education (secondary or less, post-secondary training, or
post-graduate degree), whether the TD attended UCD, and whether the TD attended a fees-paying secondary school.
As not all variables are available for all individuals, some TDs are dropped from the analyses for Local born, Education
level, Attended UCD, and Attended fee school. Full results are in Online Appendix Tables A.4, A.5, and A.6.
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or running in the same district. The data do not appear to support this hypothesis (Figure 6).
Although cabinet legacies on average have more relatives who have served in the past than non-
cabinet legacies, they are no more likely to share the same last name, and are actually less likely to
run in the same district. Including these variables as controls for the subsample of legacies (non-
cabinet legacies and cabinet legacies) does not reduce the roughly 10-percentage-point advantage
of cabinet legacies over non-cabinet legacies (Table 6), and not one of these variables is itself
statistically significant.20
Figure 6: Strength of the dynasty, by legacy status
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Note: Generation refers to the total number of family members, including the TD, who have served up to that point.
Same name and Same district are measured based on whether the TD shared a name or district with any predecessor,
not necessarily the most immediate predecessor, or in the case of cabinet legacies with multiple predecessors, the
predecessor who served in cabinet. Y-axis is proportion for binary variables; mean for generation.
Finally, an additional possibility to take into account is that there may be some confounding
variable (Z) that affects both status as a cabinet legacy (X) and cabinet selection (Y), thus making
the correlation between cabinet legacy and cabinet selection we have identified spurious. Put
simply, legacy status is not randomly assigned, so the correlation we have shown could indicate a
causal relationship, or it could be the result of the omitted Z variable that affects the probability of
being a cabinet legacy and the probability of selection into cabinet.21 The most obvious possibility
is variation in the regional strength of candidates’ parties.22 For example, suppose that party leaders
20In terms of predecessor relationship, 55 percent of both non-cabinet legacies and cabinet legacies followed their
father into politics. The type of predecessor relationship also has no effect on the coefficient for Cabinet legacy.
21The existence of this type of confounder is usually referred to as selection bias, or a non-ignorability problem.
22An additional possibility, which we are unable to fully test with our data, is that inherent genetic traits, com-
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Table 6: Unpacking the informational advantage: strength of the dynasty?
(1) (2) (3)
Cabinet legacy 0.101 0.109 0.105
(0.045) (0.045) (0.046)
Number of wins 0.085 0.085 0.084
(0.021) (0.022) (0.021)
Number of wins2 -0.008 -0.008 -0.008
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Generation 0.008
(0.017)
Same name -0.057
(0.058)
Same district -0.004
(0.032)
Constant -0.086 -0.016 -0.061
(0.060) (0.060) (0.043)
N 378 378 378
R2 0.187 0.189 0.187
Party-Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Note: Robust standard errors clustered on individual TD in parentheses. The comparison group is non-cabinet legacies.
tend to reward TDs from districts or regions of the country where the party is strong. These very
same areas may also produce more dynasties since TDs may be more electorally secure.
To evaluate this possibility, we present our main regression specifications with party-region-
year fixed effects in Table 7, with and without controls for seniority. We group districts into regions
based on one to three neighboring counties because of district boundary changes across elections
in our sample.23 The results shown in Table 7 provide no support for party regional strongholds
acting as a confounding variable affecting both cabinet legacy status and cabinet selection. Even
within the same region, cabinet legacies enjoy a higher probability of cabinet selection than other
TDs. The point estimate for Cabinet legacy increases to 10 percentage points and is significant at
petence, or human capital within certain families may lead to higher probabilities that both predecessors and their
successors will be drawn to politics and promoted to higher office.
23For example, boundary changes meant that Cavan and Monaghan counties were sometimes separate districts, but
other times a combined district. We code all observations from these districts as being in a combined Cavan-Monaghan
“region.” This does not affect districts like Louth, Waterford, Wexford, and Wicklow, whose boundaries have always
been coterminous with the counties.
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Table 7: Unpacking the informational advantage: party strongholds?
(1) (2)
Non-cabinet legacy -0.002 -0.009
(0.024) (0.026)
Cabinet legacy 0.103 0.101
(0.045) (0.046)
Number of wins 0.064
(0.012)
Number of wins2 -0.005
(0.001)
Constant 0.098 -0.031
(0.009) (0.023)
N 1,477 1,477
R2 0.321 0.343
Party-Region-Year FE Yes Yes
Note: Robust standard errors clustered on individual TD in parentheses.
the .05 level.
Ultimately, our observational data do not allow us to rule out all potential mechanisms
behind what we have called the informational advantage, so these results should be viewed as ex-
ploratory, and interpreted accordingly. However, it appears that cabinet legacies’ advantage in cab-
inet selection may in part operate through higher levels of educational qualifications or attendance
at Ireland’s elite schools. The latter correlation suggests that network effects may be important.
Conclusion
In parliamentary democracies, effective political power rests with the cabinet. Consequently, un-
derstanding which legislative parties enter cabinet is important. Which parties acquire specific
ministries has also been the subject of increasing attention, in part reflecting a growing apprecia-
tion that individual cabinet ministers are able to set the agenda and control policy production and
implementation in their respective portfolios. Constitutionally, however, cabinet posts are typically
assigned to individuals rather than to parties. Individual ministers may be loyal agents of their par-
ties (or the coalition agreement), but they may also shirk and pursue a personal agenda, based on
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their own preferences. Despite the vast scholarship on cabinet government, and on agency prob-
lems in the parliamentary chain of delegation (Strøm, 2000), relatively little research has explored
the question of which individuals become cabinet ministers. All too often, answers to “who gets
a cabinet seat?” have started and stopped at the party level, leaving the question of “who is the
who?” unanswered.
In this study, we have sought to make a theoretical and empirical contribution to the nascent
literatures on individual-level ministerial selection in parliamentary democracies and dynastic pol-
itics. Theoretically, we posited that MPs who come from dynasties with a history in cabinet, who
we call “cabinet legacies,” may possess advantages over non-legacies in promotion from the back-
bench to the cabinet. We suggested that, in addition to the well-understood electoral advantages
of legacy, an established family record in higher office could create an additional informational
advantage that would give cabinet legacies an advantage over other backbench MPs in cabinet
promotion, including non-cabinet legacies.
Our findings from Ireland indicate that cabinet legacies are decidedly advantaged when
it comes to the allocation of a finite number of ministerial positions, and that this advantage is
not primarily related to the significantly greater electoral advantages they enjoy. Interestingly, we
find that non-cabinet legacies in Ireland are no more likely to get promoted to cabinet than their
peers, despite enjoying the same electoral advantages as cabinet legacies. This may be because
the multi-member electoral system used in Ireland facilitates electoral security for members of
established dynasties, but these electorally safe TDs may not enjoy wider appeal or popularity
in (or beyond) their districts. Our exploration of potential mechanisms behind the informational
advantage suggests that elite networks developed through private schooling and higher education
may be part of the explanation for the informational advantage, though we cannot rule out other
possibilities, such as genetics.
We see a number of avenues for future research. First, as we have already hinted, any
legacy advantage in ministerial selection may depend on the power of the prime minister or party
leader to choose her ministers. The power afforded to party leaders in ministerial selection may
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vary across countries (O’Malley, 2007), and may also be constrained by factors such as stronger
norms for seniority rule in promotions. The relative contribution of the electoral and informational
advantages of legacy to the overall legacy advantage in cabinet promotion may also vary by other
institutional or contextual differences across countries. Future research should therefore evaluate
the legacy advantage across different institutional and party organizational constraints.
Second, future research should examine whether cabinet legacies continue to be advantaged
even after it has been decided that they will enter cabinet. Within a cabinet, individual portfolios
can differ in importance, prestige or salience (Warwick and Druckman, 2001). The office of prime
minister or finance minister is likely more of a prize than, for example, being the minister for sports
or culture. The possibility of a hierarchy of portfolios begs the question as to whether cabinet
ministers who are cabinet legacies are more likely to secure more significant portfolios, and more
quickly, or whether the portfolios they secure are similar to those secured by their predecessors.
Third, we have not attempted to evaluate whether legacies or cabinet legacies actually make
for more, or less, effective ministers than non-legacies. One measure of performance could relate
to their durability (for example, against reshuﬄes) compared to other cabinet colleagues. Or it
could be that the presence of cabinet legacies at the heart of government impacts the quality of
public policy and governance. In recent years, dynastic politics have been blamed in the media
for producing stale leadership in the face of governance problems, not only in Ireland, but also in
democracies with a high presence of dynasties like Japan, India, and the Philippines. In Indonesia,
debate over the issue resulted in legislation prohibiting dynasties (later overturned by the Consti-
tutional Court). The main opposition party in Japan, the Democratic Party of Japan, imposed an
internal party restriction on dynastic candidate selection prior to the 2009 election, in large part to
call negative attention toward the recent prevalence of dynastic prime ministers in the ruling Liberal
Democratic Party (Smith, 2013). On the other hand, preliminary research by Besley and Reynal-
Querol (2015) suggests that having a dynastic chief political executive might positively impact the
rate of economic growth, but only where the leader enjoys significant executive decision-making
autonomy.
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If members of dynasties do indeed make for better or worse leaders, then our findings
raise potentially profound questions for the design and operation of democratic political systems.
Cabinets are at the center of power in parliamentary systems, and the ability of individual cabinet
ministers to control policy formation and implementation within their own ministries provides a
privileged few with unique opportunities to shape political outcomes (Blondel, 1985; Laver and
Shepsle, 1994, 1996; Thies, 2001). For democratic theorists and advocates of electoral and repre-
sentative democracy, it is thus important to understand why ministerial selection appears to favor
a select cadre of party members, and whether this apparent bias in who gets selected actually
produces any negative effect on governance. We believe this is an important question for future re-
search, and a natural extension of the growing literature on the impact of the distribution of power
in cabinets, not only between parties, but also within.
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Appendix
Figure A.1: Proportion of candidates, TDs, government-party TDs, and cabinet ministers in the Republic of
Ireland, by legacy status, 1944-2016
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Note: Candidate and TD samples include by-election candidates and winners. Cabinet minister sample excludes non-
TD cabinet ministers, and combines all cabinets formed during the term. The primary sources of the candidate data are
Elections Ireland (electionsireland.org), Gallagher (1993), and Gallagher (2009) for elections prior to 2011. Source
for 2011 and 2016 elections is The Independent newspaper (online). Ministerial appointment data are from the website
of the Taoiseach (Prime Minister). Data sources for family ties are listed in footnote 9.
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Table A.1: Descriptive statistics of the data sample: candidates
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Win (DV1) 8,715 0.3860 0.4869 0 1
Share of quota (DV2) 8,693 0.4927 0.3608 0 2.5
Non-cabinet legacy 8,715 0.0974 0.2965 0 1
Cabinet legacy 8,715 0.0414 0.1993 0 1
Female 8,715 0.1138 0.3176 0 1
First-time candidate 8,715 0.3980 0.4895 0 1
Party name Number Percent
Fianna Fa´il 2,500 28.69
Fine Gael 2,112 24.23
Labour 1,044 11.98
Sinn Fe´in 397 4.56
Progressive Democrats 196 2.25
Green Party 237 2.72
Democratic Left 38 0.44
Christian Solidarity 55 0.63
Independents 1,473 16.90
Indep. Labour/National Labour 24 0.28
Workers’ Party 138 1.58
Socialist 27 0.31
People Before Profit 37 0.42
New Vision 20 0.23
Clann na Poblachta 173 1.99
Clann na Talmhan 66 0.76
Other minor parties 178 2.04
Total 8,175 100
Note: Sample includes by-election candidates. The number of observations for Share of the quota is lower due to
unopposed candidates and former Speakers (Cinn Chomhairle), who are returned automatically.
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Table A.2: Descriptive statistics of the data sample: backbench governing-party TDs
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Cabinet appointment 1,477 0.10 0.31 0 1
Non-cabinet legacy 1,477 0.18 0.39 0 1
Cabinet legacy 1,477 0.07 0.26 0 1
Number of wins 1,477 3.31 2.49 1 15
Share of quota 1,474 0.83 0.24 0.08 2.05
Prior local assembly experience 1,477 0.55 0.50 0 1
Prior Seanad experience 1,477 0.04 0.19 0 1
ISCO occupation code:
1 = Senior officials, managers 1,477 0.16 0.37 0 1
2 = Professionals 1,477 0.40 0.49 0 1
3 = Technicians, associate professionals 1,477 0.12 0.32 0 1
4 = Clerks 1,477 0.02 0.15 0 1
5 = Service workers, shop workers 1,477 0.07 0.25 0 1
6 = Skilled agricultural, fishery workers 1,477 0.17 0.38 0 1
7 = Craft and related trades workers 1,477 0.04 0.20 0 1
8 = Machine operators, assemblers 1,477 0.01 0.07 0 1
9 = Elementary occupations 1,477 0.01 0.07 0 1
10 = Military/IRA 1,477 0.01 0.08 0 1
Female 1,477 0.08 0.28 0 1
Age 1,477 47.25 10.70 21 75
Local born 1,424 0.80 0.40 0 1
Post-secondary training or degree (only) 1,345 0.50 0.50 0 1
Post-graduate degree 1,345 0.09 0.28 0 1
Attended UCD 1,326 0.22 0.42 0 1
Attended fees-paying secondary school 1,279 0.18 0.39 0 1
Party name Number Percent
Fianna Fa´il 882 59.72
Fine Gael 399 27.01
Labour 140 9.48
Progressive Democrats 14 0.95
Greens 5 0.34
Democratic Left 6 0.41
Independent 8 0.54
National Labour 5 0.34
Clann na Poblachta 10 0.68
Clann na Talmhan 8 0.54
Total 1,477 100
Note: Sample excludes Prime Minister, Speaker (Ceann Comhairle), and TDs with previous cabinet experience.
Includes by-election winners. The number of observations for Share of the quota is lower due to unopposed candidates
and former Cinn Chomhairle, who are returned automatically.
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Table A.3: The direct and indirect effects of being a cabinet legacy: LSEM approach
DV: Cabinet Share of Cabinet
appt. quota appt.
Cabinet legacy 0.090 0.054 0.077
(0.039) (0.039) (0.042)
Number of wins 0.064 0.066 0.050
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Number of wins2 -0.005 -0.005 -0.004
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Share of quota 0.231
(0.039)
Constant -0.035 0.690 -0.195
(0.016) (0.017) (0.033)
N 1,477 1,474 1,474
R2 0.077 0.155 0.104
Party-Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Note: Robust standard errors clustered on individual TD in parentheses. Non-cabinet legacies are excluded, so the
comparison is cabinet legacies to non-legacies. The total effect (c) is the coefficient on Cabinet legacy in the first
column = .09. The indirect effect (ab = .01) is the product of the coefficient on Cabinet legacy in the second column
(a = .05) and the coefficient on Share of quota in the third column (b = .23). The direct effect (c′) is equal to c - ab =
.08.
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Table A.4: The legacy advantage conditioning on pre-electoral attributes (1): experience
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Non-cabinet legacy -0.018 -0.026 -0.016 -0.020
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
Cabinet legacy 0.086 0.076 0.083 0.065
(0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039)
Number of wins 0.065 0.063 0.065 0.070
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010)
Number of wins2 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Prior local assembly experience -0.070
(0.017)
Prior Seanad experience 0.070
(0.055)
ISCO-2 = Professionals 0.069
(0.026)
ISCO-3 = Technicians -0.022
(0.029)
ISCO-4 = Clerks -0.013
(0.049)
ISCO-5 = Service workers -0.066
(0.029)
ISCO-6 = Agricultural, fishery -0.040
(0.027)
ISCO-7 = Craft and trades -0.057
(0.040)
ISCO-8 = Machine operators 0.071
(0.118)
ISCO-9 = Elementary occupations -0.065
(0.046)
ISCO-10 = Military/IRA -0.023
(0.100)
Constant -0.032 0.012 -0.036 -0.054
(0.017) (0.019) (0.017) (0.028)
N 1,477 1,477 1,477 1,477
R2 0.078 0.089 0.080 0.103
Party-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: Robust standard errors clustered on individual TD in parentheses. Experience controls include categorical
dummies for prior experience (i.e., before being elected to the Da´il) in a local assembly, prior experience in the
Seanad, and prior occupation (baseline category is ISCO 1 = Senior officials and managers).
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Table A.5: The legacy advantage conditioning on pre-electoral attributes (2): demographics
(1) (2) (3)
Non-cabinet legacy -0.023 -0.033 -0.021
(0.020) (0.020) (0.021)
Cabinet legacy 0.083 0.069 0.080
(0.039) (0.040) (0.038)
Number of wins 0.065 0.074 0.067
(0.009) (0.010) (0.010)
Number of wins2 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Female 0.039
(0.030)
Age 30-39 0.059
(0.028)
Age 40-49 0.043
(0.028)
Age 50-59 -0.002
(0.030)
Age 60 and older -0.098
(0.032)
Local born -0.051
(0.023)
Constant -0.036 -0.071 0.009
(0.017) (0.026) (0.025)
N 1,477 1,477 1,424
R2 0.079 0.098 0.083
Party-Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Note: Robust standard errors clustered on individual TD in parentheses. Demographic controls include categorical
dummies for gender, age group (baseline category is Age 21-29), and whether the TD was born locally (within the
county).
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Table A.6: The legacy advantage conditioning on pre-electoral attributes (3): education
(1) (2) (3)
Non-cabinet legacy -0.040 -0.035 -0.040
(0.021) (0.021) (0.023)
Cabinet legacy 0.038 0.041 0.043
(0.039) (0.039) (0.041)
Number of wins 0.075 0.074 0.074
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Number of wins2 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Post-secondary training or degree (only) 0.104
(0.018)
Post-graduate degree 0.174
(0.041)
Attended UCD 0.116
(0.025)
Attended fees-paying secondary school 0.057
(0.027)
Constant -0.106 -0.058 -0.040
(0.023) (0.020) (0.020)
N 1,345 1,326 1,279
R2 0.113 0.107 0.092
Party-Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Note: Robust standard errors clustered on individual TD in parentheses. Education controls include categorical vari-
ables for level of education (baseline category is secondary or less), whether the TD attended the University College
Dublin (UCD), and whether the TD attended a fees-paying secondary school (a private institution).
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